China's global role
By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: December 24, 2012
Dec 20th 2012, 5:15 by T.P. | BEIJING
MANY aspire to it, but few succeed. Any modern parent juggling the demands of a job and a family knows all too well how difficult it can be to "have it all". But what about a certain emerging Asian superpower?
Edward Luttwak, an American military strategist, argues in his new book that China's simultaneous pursuit of three strategic goals is untenable. In his view, it must soon choose between them if it is to avert catastrophe.
Mr Luttwak's fundamental contention is "the inherent incompatibility between the concurrently rapid growth of China's economic capacity and military strength and diplomatic influence". He acknowledges plainly that he is no China specialist, but just as plainly he believes that his "logic of strategy" applies as rigidly to China's geopolitics as does Newton's law of gravity to any apple falling anywhere in the world.
According to this immutable logic, China's drive towards military aggrandisement will push other countries towards anti-China coalitions that reduce rather than enhance China's diplomatic clout. And because China can effectively deter direct military action, nations seeking to counter its rise will be bound to choose "eco-strategic containment" strategies that slow, rather than enhance, the growth China needs so desperately to maintain.
Mr Luttwak catalogues ways in which other regional powers, each with its own twist, have already begun forming new linkages to counter growing Chinese might. This sped up significantly since 2008, he writes, when the world financial crisis "unleashed Chinese triumphalism" and triggered a phase of "feckless and reckless" foreign-policy conduct. Current events continue feeding grist to Mr Luttwak's mill. China last month announced a significant new advance in military capabilities, reporting a fighter jet's successful landing on China's new aircraft-carrier. Also in November, Myanmar's played host to a visit by the American president, Barack Obama, which marked a dramatic shift in policy for a strategically important neighbour that had long been considered to be aligned reliably with China.
Mr Luttwak regards the logic of strategy as being more pertinent to China's situation than the ancient writings and traditions that inform so much of the leadership's thinking. He offers harsh and colourful criticism of the gaps in knowledge and creativity among Chinese policymakers, attributing to them such afflictions as "Great-state autism," and "acquired strategic deficiency syndrome."
Coming in for criticism by name is Sun Tzu, whose writings of 2,500 years ago, including "The Art of War", are the main source of what Mr Luttwak calls "the flawed principles of ancient unwisdom". He grants that the cunning statecraft, stratagems for deception and diplomatic finesse advocated by Sun Tzu may have worked when used by one warring Chinese state against another. But he argues that these doctrines have served China poorly in fending off other adversaries.
With a quick pass through the history of China's engagement with Jurchens, Khitans, Mongols, Manchus and other Asiatic nomads, he notes that China has been ruled by Hans, its ethnic majority, for only about a third of the past millennium. "While Han generals in charge of large armies were busy quoting Sun Tzu to each other, relatively small numbers of mounted warriors schooled in the rudely effective strategy and tactics of the steppe outmanoeuvred and defeated their forces," he writes.
He is convincing (and highly entertaining) on this point. But there remains something jarring about Mr Luttwak's broader insistence on the utter inviolability of his own logic; and also a sense that he has cherrypicked quotations and events to support his arguments. Such overreach notwithstanding, his thesis is sensible and not to be discounted lightly. It cannot of course be tested as easily as Newton's laws. But given that Chinese generals likely still quote Sun Tzu to each other, there should yet be opportunities to see how it holds up.
美軍事專家：中國難以同時強化經濟、軍事及外交影響力
2012-12-24 Web only 作者：經濟學人
每個試圖兼顧工作和家庭的家長都知道，「兩全其美」是件多麼困難的事；但如果主角換成了某個崛起的亞洲強權呢？美國軍事策略專家Edward Luttwak在他的新書中指出，中國不可能同時追尋三個策略目標。他認為，中國得儘快作出抉擇才能避免災難發生。
Luttwak的主要論點是，經濟不可能與軍事和外交影響力同步快速成長。他明白地承認自己並不是中國專家，但他也相信，「策略的邏輯」可以套用於中國的地理政治，就像是牛律的引力定律適用於全球每個角落的蘋果。
根據這套永恆不變的邏輯，中國強化軍力會促使其他國家朝著反中聯盟前行，進而拉低而非增強中國的外交影響力。由於中國有能力嚇阻直接軍事行動，各國會改從經濟來抑制中國崛起，進而拉低而非提高中國的經濟成長。
Luttwak列出了其他國家建立新關係以反制中國的方式，近期的事件似乎也站在他這一邊。上個月，中國戰鬥機成功降落新航空母艦，顯示其軍事實力有了重大進展；同一個月，緬甸接待了美國總統歐巴馬，代表緬甸這個中國的堅定盟友，在政策方面有了重大轉變。
Luttwak認為策略的邏輯比古代作品和傳統更切合中國的現況，更指出孫子兵法就是許多錯誤原則的主要來源。
Luttwak堅持自己這套邏輯有如不可違反的鐵則，聽起來確實有些刺耳，而且他似乎刻意只挑出了支持自己看法的引言和事件；不過，他的理論仍有不可輕忽的合理之處。這套理論當然不像牛頓定律那麼輕易就能測試，但未來應該會有機會看看它到底站不站得住腳。（黃維德）
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