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Charlemagne

By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: October 26, 2012

But the euro zone is still struggling to find a way of keeping Greece afloat.

Oct 13th 2012 | from the print edition

EUROPE’S charge-sheet against Antonis Samaras has lengthened with each turn of the Greek crisis. As leader of the-then opposition New Democracy, his refusal to support the first bail-out was seen as crippling. Later on, when he backed the unity government of Lucas Papademos, Mr Samaras was evasive about the second rescue. And by forcing early elections this year, he was blamed for opening the door to extremists of all stripes. Would it not be better, some thought, if Greece just left the euro?

These days, as prime minister, Mr Samaras has started to command a measure of respect. After a meeting of euro-zone finance ministers this week, their president, Jean-Claude Juncker, went out of his way to praise the Greek leader: “I am impressed…The Greek government is behaving, I do think, in an admirable way.” The visit to Athens this week by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, (see article) is the clearest signal yet that “Grexit” is no longer on her mind. One reason for embracing Mr Samaras is that he is the lesser evil, given the alternative of Alexis Tsipras, the radical leftist. Another is that keeping Greece in the euro is less awful than the chaos of Grexit. A third factor is that Mr Samaras seems to embrace Europe’s terms for assistance.

Eurocrats detect a seriousness of purpose about him, not least in appointing a respected economist, Yannis Stournaras, as finance minister. Then there is the factor that nobody will admit to: the policy of demanding harsh, front-loaded austerity has done unnecessary harm. Greece’s recession this year will, yet again, be much deeper than forecast in April, and so will next year’s, according to the IMF’s latest figures. The euro zone would never stoop to the mea culpa offered by the IMF in its latest World Economic Outlook, which admits to underestimating badly the effect of austerity in reducing economic output. The euro zone can, after all, always blame the indolence of earlier Greek governments. Still, when confronted with deeper-than-expected recessions, Spain and Portugal won an extra year to meet their target of bringing budget deficits below 3% of GDP.

Backed by the IMF’s boss, Christine Lagarde, Greece may well be granted the extra two years it wants to meet its objective of achieving a large primary budget balance (ie, before interest payments) in 2014. A deal is likely to be reached in November. But first Greece must overcome the political deficit among euro-zone states: they may no longer want to push Greece out, but neither do they want to lend it more billions to keep it in.

The conundrum breaks down into three parts. First, Greece must find €13.5 billion ($17.4 billion) worth of savings and taxes in 2013 and 2014 to fill a gap made worse by the paralysis of two general elections this spring. Though it claims such budget-cutting is too much, too soon, Greece seems close to agreement with the troika (the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank). Second, granting Greece a two-year reprieve means finding another €10 billion to €20 billion. Greece contends, implausibly, that it requires no additional loans from the euro zone, yet at the very least it needs the benevolence of the ECB. The bank would have to let Greece issue more short-term bills (most will end up on the ECB’s balance-sheet via Greek banks) and agree to roll over a big chunk of Greek debt it holds. The ECB says a rollover would amount to illegal monetary financing. The third, and most serious problem is that the economic outlook for Greece is so poor that it will probably miss by a long shot the target of bringing debt down to 120% of GDP by 2020—the level set to justify a big haircut on private bondholders this year, and at which the economy is deemed able to survive without outside help.

Greece thinks confidence would make its economy rebound. So the IMF, though sceptical of the degree of austerity demanded by the lords of the euro zone, now finds itself cast as the pitiless enforcer because of its reluctance to make the numbers fit the euro zone’s limits. It has quietly pushed the euro zone to write off some of Greece’s debt. Unless America can convince the IMF to go soft by accepting a rosier forecast, the Europeans may have to lend Greece more money (difficult), forgive some of its debt (almost impossible), or both. As always, they will try to fudge, at least until Germany’s general election. One idea is to bring forward loan disbursements to keep Greece going, with the promise to look at any shortfall later on. Another is to declare Greece’s long-term outlook too uncertain even for economists to predict; the euro zone could then pledge to deal with Greece’s long-term debt if growth disappoints. And if the IMF refuses to keep lending to Greece, the euro zone could take on the burden on its
own, ignoring the IMF, as it once did for Latvia.

It all began in Athens

Fate decreed that the euro-zone crisis should start in Greece. Lies about its public finances instilled the belief, particularly in Germany, that the euro’s problem was excessive debt, and the solution was tough spending cuts. Yet the woes of Spain show that even running a budget surplus is no insurance against economic meltdown. As well as worrying about excessive austerity, the IMF’s report raises concern about “policy uncertainty”—including fears about the break-up of the euro—which makes a recession deeper and recovery slower. The IMF sets out a sensible to-do list, such as creating a banking union that includes a single euro-zone supervisor. These issues will be the focus of a European summit on October 18th-19th.

Greece may be right in thinking that the biggest boost to its economy would be to end the “drachma drama”. But restoring confidence must also involve creditor countries, above all Germany. The euro’s problem is not just dysfunctional states, like Greece, but also a dysfunctional currency zone.

Economist.com/blogs/charlemagne

希臘不退出歐盟了

2012-10-17 天下雜誌 508期 作者：經濟學人

歐洲領袖們允許希臘繼續留在歐盟。但就算還款減赤的年限被容許延後，希臘要克服的經濟問題還很多。

過去，希臘的每一輪債信危機，都讓希臘總理薩馬拉斯罪加一等。

一○年，這位前反對黨領袖，拒絕支持對希臘的第一次紓困方案；今年，薩馬拉斯迫使聯合政府分裂，堅持提前進行國會大選，他再度被指責為向極端份子開大門。不少歐洲領袖甚至認為，希臘離開歐元區會更好。

但最近，擔任首相的薩馬拉斯，卻被歐洲領袖頻頻讚許。上週，歐元區財長會議結束後，歐元集團主席容克公開誇獎，「希臘政府的作為值得敬重，讓我印象深刻，」

本週，德國總理梅克爾訪問雅典，也間接宣示她不會考慮讓希臘退出歐元區。

歐洲最近開始擁抱薩馬拉斯，有三個理由：第一，他比希臘另一個激進左派領袖齊普拉斯理性。第二，留住希臘，至少能免於希臘退出後可能發生的亂象。第三，薩馬拉斯似乎已願意接受歐盟的條件，換取金援。薩馬拉斯任命知名經濟學家史杜納拉斯為財政部長，讓歐盟官員感受到他的誠意。

還債延兩年 利息多兩百億

還有一個沒人會承認的理由：歐元區各國對希臘撙節政策的嚴苛要求，反而對希臘經濟造成了不必要的傷害。

根據國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）最新報告，希臘的經濟衰退將遠比今年四月的預測更嚴重。當然，歐元區領袖不會承認，是自己低估了撙節政策對希臘的衝擊，只會怪希臘政府懶惰無能。

然而，當西班牙和葡萄牙，同樣陷入比預期更嚴重的經濟衰退時，還款減赤的時間卻得以延長一年。

因此，今年十一月，希臘將可望在IMF「大老闆」拉嘉德背書下，獲得額外寬限的兩年，在二○一四年前才需還款。

但首先，希臘仍需克服三大問題：第一，必須在明、後年，湊齊一三五億歐元，填補今春兩次大選的財政缺口。

第二，延遲兩年還款，也意味著將多出一至兩百億的利息。儘管希臘聲稱不需要歐元區額外的貸款，但它仍需再向歐洲央行進行融資。

第三，也是最嚴重的問題，希臘經濟前景如此惡劣，很可能無法達成在二○二○年，債務佔GDP一二○％以下的目標。這將使希臘失去民間債權人的信心。

希臘需要信心，經濟才會恢復。因此，IMF也勉強同意，目前希臘的減赤和還款，已符合與歐元區的約定，讓歐元區悄悄取消了部份希臘的債務。（張翔一譯）