Ore-inspiring
Mar 12th 2016 |
IN DECEMBER an adviser to China’s government predicted that GDP growth would soon rebound. Now was a good time, he said, to buy shares in companies that mined copper, nickel and coal—though even he drew the line at investing in iron ore, whose supply was simply too abundant. The adviser sounded insanely bullish back then; he might now rue his caution. On March 7th the price of iron ore jumped by 19%, a record one-day rise, in a sign of renewed optimism about China’s growth.
The spike in the iron-ore price came hard on the heels of a speech by Li Keqiang, China’s prime minister, to the annual National People’s Congress in Beijing. In it, Mr Li announced a punchy GDP growth target of 6.5-7% for 2016, along with the means he hoped would secure it: a bigger budget deficit than had been planned for last year and faster credit growth.
With sufficient stimulus China will avoid a sharp economic slowdown. But Mr Li did not simply open the macroeconomic spigots. He hinted that the fiscal boost would be designed to help rebalance the economy: China is aiming for just 3% growth in government revenue this year, suggesting that more of the deficit will come from tax cuts to private firms. He made clear that reforms to reduce overcapacity in low-end and inefficient industries were a priority. And by switching from a single-figure growth target to a range, Mr Li gave himself more flexibility in trading off some GDP growth for more reform.
Look closer, though, and there is little sign of any real commitment to reform (see article). Promises to slim industries such as steel and coal sound tough—the government expects nearly 2m workers will be laid off—but the planned reduction would make only a small dent in oversupply. Instead the government seems to be doubling down on its well-worn recipe of debt- and investment-fuelled growth.
Reaching the goal of 6.5-7% GDP growth will require either a fudging of the figures or investment in projects of dubious worth. A second train line to remote and mountainous Tibet is planned. Banks are being leant on to juice up the economy. Credit is growing at twice the rate of nominal GDP, in a country already overburdened by private debt. A big increase in the money supply will put downward pressure on China’s currency, which in turn will lead either to a rapid rundown in foreign-exchange reserves or a devaluation.
In theory, China’s capital controls can ease the pressure, by making it harder for money to leave the country. And the latest figures suggest they are becoming more effective. Reserves dropped by just $29 billion in February, to $3.2 trillion, after three months of heavier falls. But even if China can successfully police its financial borders, rapid credit growth will fuel asset prices at home. Wary of the stockmarket, investors with cash to spare see property as the safest bet. Unregulated online lenders are helping them pile on leverage, skirting rules requiring minimum down-payments on homes. There are worrying signs of a bubble in several big cities: house prices in Shenzhen have risen by 53% in the past year (see article).
Supporting a sagging economy with cheap money and tax cuts is sensible. But China also needs to put in place the structural reforms that will make such stimulus both more effective and less destabilising.
The default of a few of the most hopeless state-owned enterprises, something Mr Li again promised in his speech, would set a useful precedent. It might also nudge banks into lending to profitable businesses instead of firms they expect to be bailed out by government. New homes with few ready buyers in lower-tier cities should be turned into social housing; better that than trying to pump up a broader property bubble to clear unsold stocks. In places where house prices are soaring, the government should summon the courage to introduce a long-discussed property tax to cool speculation. And now would be a good time to recapitalise China’s banks in readiness for a write-down of the latent bad debts on their balance-sheets.
Yet the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, apparently wishes to avoid even mild turbulence in the economy, at least until he has appointed his own nominees to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, a key decision-making body, in 2017. (Many suspect that reform will remain elusive even after that date.) Mr Xi is scarcely alone among world leaders in setting policy with an eye on the political calendar. But financial markets cannot be relied on to play along with this schedule. At some point, China must deal with its excess debts and industrial overcapacity. By taking bolder steps on reforms now, China would do more to entrench faith in its longer-term economic outlook than stimulus measures ever could.
倚賴刺激而非改革，中國經濟問題將更嚴重
作者：黃維德編譯 2016-03-15
16日結束的第12屆中國人民代表大會第四次會議，中國政府確切承諾了什麼？
中國總理李克強在全國人民代表大會中宣佈，2016年的GDP成長目標為6.5-7%，並計畫以擴大預算赤字、加快信貸成長來達成此目標。
李克強亦明確表示，減少低階、缺乏效率產業的產能過剩問題，為改革的首要目標之一。GDP目標由單一數字改為區間，亦賦予李克強更多推動改革的彈性空間。
然而，仔細觀察後就會發現，李克強並未做出任何實質的改革承諾。承諾為鋼鐵、煤礦等產業瘦身聽來強硬，但預定的減產量只會稍稍緩和產能過剩問題。反之，中國政府似乎決定繼續加碼，靠債務和投資來帶動成長。
中國政府想達成6.5%到7%的GDP成長目標，只有操控數據、或是投資價值存疑的計畫這兩種方法。中國目前正計畫興建第二條通往西藏的鐵路，並倚仗銀行帶動經濟；信貸成長的速度為名目GDP的2倍，而中國的私人負債已然過高。大幅增加貨幣供給亦將使人民幣的貶值壓力更增一層。
理論上，中國的資本管制可以減緩貶值壓力，但就算中國可以有效管控資本，信貸快速成長仍舊會推升國內資產的價格。
房市泡沫警訊
幾座大城市也出現了令人擔憂的泡沫化警訊，例如，過去一年裡，深圳的房價已成長53%。利用減稅和增加貨幣供給來支持經濟，有其合理之處，但中國也必須推動結構性改革，才能讓刺激方案更有效率，並減少它們為經濟帶來的不穩定。
讓少數最沒有前景的國營企業倒閉，將立下十分重要的先例，也有機會讓銀行轉而借款給能獲利的企業。將難以出售的新屋轉為社會住宅，也會比擴大不動產泡沫範圍以清空未出售的房屋來得好。而在房價高漲之地，政府應推動不動產稅以減少投機。此外，這也是個改善銀行體質、增加銀行打消壞債能力的好機會。
然而，習近平似乎想在2017年提名政治局常委之前，避開任何經濟亂流。依照政治時間表設定政策的領袖，當然不是只有習近平，但金融市場不一定會跟著這份時間表前行。
中國必須處理債務過高和產能過剩問題，而在此刻推出大膽改革，將有助提振各界對中國長期前景的信心，而且效果絕對高過任何刺激方案。（黃維德編譯）
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