China’s economy
By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: September 13, 2012
The government has proved uncharacteristically hesitant to revive growth in China. That’s a good sign.
Sep 1st 2012 | from the print edition
THE Chinese economy has a habit of beating expectations. For ten years in a row, from 2001 to 2010, its growth rate exceeded the IMF’s spring forecast, often by a big margin. But this year it is likely to disappoint. In recent months, industrial output has slowed sharply; stocks of unsold goods are piling up; and Shanghai’s stockmarket is at a three-year low. For the first time this century, in 2012 China’s growth rate may dip below 8%. With the world ever more dependent on China’s economy, that is worrying.
No economy can grow by double digits forever. As China’s economy matures and its labour force peaks, it is only natural that its pace of expansion eases. But the slowdown of recent quarters is cyclical, not structural, reflecting a loss of puff, rather than a shortening stride. China has seen a sharp drop in demand, as export sales fall and residential investment falters.
Some of the global headwinds buffeting China were foreseeable (see article). Nonetheless, most economists assumed the country’s policymakers could quickly revive growth if necessary. In China, in contrast to Japan or America, interest rates (and bank reserve requirements) have plenty of room to fall. China has an enviable amount of fiscal leeway. And its property slowdown largely reflects government curbs on speculative homebuying that officials could lift, if they so chose.
The government has done some of what was expected of it. It has cut rates and reserve requirements a bit. Infrastructure spending has picked up. In replacing business taxes with a value-added tax, the government has eased the fiscal burden on small firms. It is also happy to help first-time homebuyers.
But its actions have lacked any of the clarity or urgency of November 2008, when policymakers rallied the banks, state-owned enterprises and local officials to fend off the global financial crisis. That stimulus turned out to be bigger than the crisis warranted. This year, in the face of a much smaller shock, the government’s response has fallen short.
What explains its hesitation? Some now doubt the central bank’s ability to revive growth. Even if it did ease rates and other lending restraints, credit would not rebound, they argue, because the banks cannot find willing borrowers. As with the proverbial slow boat to China, there is a rip in the country’s monetary sails. Others blame a twist in the rudder: the policymakers who steer the economy are distracted and divided, preoccupied with this year’s handover of power, which is not going as smoothly as hoped.
Erring do
There is some truth in these arguments. But they are not the whole story. China’s policymakers are still capable of reviving growth. But some are no longer willing to do so at any cost. The divisions at the top are philosophical as well as political.
Economic expansion used to trump almost everything else. Keeping the growth rate up was second only to keeping the birth rate down on the list of priorities. But some Chinese policymakers now worry about China’s reliance on investment and about property speculation, which has priced some middle-class families out of big-city markets.
In the past, a Chinese government faced with a nasty downturn would already be repealing property curbs and appealing to state-owned firms to expand capacity. Such a clumsy, conventional response would no doubt revive growth, but would also delay the structural reforms, like financial liberalisation, that the country requires. Policymakers outside China may long for more decisive action. But if hesitation enables China to keep to the path of rebalancing its economy, it will be good news for everyone.
from the print edition | Leaders
中國為何不再大手筆救經濟?
2012-09-05 天下雜誌 505期 作者:經濟學人
中國經濟惡化情況,超出預期。但這次,中國政府卻沒有像○八年一樣,大手筆救經濟。背後其實有非關政治的更深考量。
中國的經濟發展走向,總是出人意表。從二○○一年到二○一○年間,中國經濟成長率每每超出IMF的預估。但今年可能有許多人要失望了,工業生產劇烈萎縮、出不了口的貨物堆滿了倉庫,上海股市表現也是三年來最差。
二○一二年將是本世紀以來,中國的GDP年成長率首次不到八%的一年。當全世界愈來愈依靠中國的經濟,這樣的衰退令人擔憂。
沒有一個經濟體能永遠每年以兩位數的速度成長,中國的成長趨緩應該是很自然的趨勢。然而最近幾季的衰退並非結構性的,而是持續出現,好像中國這個跑者不是放慢了步伐,而是已經喘不過氣來。
儘管全球經濟大環境不利因素居多,許多專家認為,中國政府絕對有能力在短時間內,刺激經濟快速成長。
和日本、美國不同,中國銀行的利率有很大的調降空間,房地產的快速降溫,凸顯了政府打壓炒房的鐵腕。同樣的,政府只要一聲令下,房市馬上就能復甦。
中國政府也的確因應期待,推出一些振興經濟措施,例如調降利率與存款準備率,或是以增值稅代替企業稅的方式,減輕中小企業的財務負擔。
不救經濟的考量
但這回,中國政府並沒有像○八年底那麼大手筆救經濟,反而有所遲疑。有人說,這是因為政府的心思都放在年底十八大的接班上,一心無法多用。
這樣的說法並不全對,中國政府還是有搶救經濟的能力,但是高層選擇不這麼做,有政治上的因素,也有更深的考量。
經濟發展曾經是中國當政者的最高指導原則,其重要性僅次於控制生育率。中國有些決策官員現在擔心,中國的經濟成長太過依賴投資和房市,大城市的物價飛漲,讓中產階級家庭都快住不起了。
以往的中國政府面對經濟疲軟,通常是二話不說解除炒房限制,或是呼籲國營企業擴充產能。這些手段當然能帶來立即性的經濟成長,但是卻治標不治本,只會拖慢國家結構轉型的腳步,像是金融市場自由化。
其他國家的決策者或許會希望中國更果決一點,但如果多點遲疑,讓中國慢慢地摸索經濟戰略上的平衡點,對中國和全世界來說,未嘗不是好事。(劉光瑩譯)